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Deconstructing the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations
Deena Skolnick Weisberg∗ Jordan C. V. Taylor† Emily J. Hopkins†
Abstract
Previous work showed that people find explanations more satisfying when they contain irrelevant neuroscience information.
The current studies investigate why this effect happens. In Study 1 (N=322), subjects judged psychology explanations that did
or did not contain irrelevant neuroscience information. Longer explanations were judged more satisfying, as were explanations
containing neuroscience information, but these two factors made independent contributions. In Study 2 (N=255), subjects
directly compared good and bad explanations. Subjects were generally successful at selecting the good explanation except
when the bad explanation contained neuroscience and the good one did not. Study 3 (N=159) tested whether neuroscience
jargon was necessary for the effect, or whether it would obtain with any reference to the brain. Responses to these two
conditions did not differ. These results confirm that neuroscience information exerts a seductive effect on people’s judgments,
which may explain the appeal of neuroscience information within the public sphere.
Keywords: explanation, neuroscience, reasoning, seductive allure.
1 Introduction
Attention to neuroscience is growing within the public
sphere. Neuroscientific findings now play a key role in pub-
lic conversations about economics, marketing, and the law,
among other areas (e.g., Ariely & Berns, 2010; Camerer,
Loewenstein & Prelec, 2005; Farah, 2012; Greene & Co-
hen, 2004; Roskies, 2002; Satel & Lilienfeld, 2013). For
example, neuroscience data are often used in courtrooms
as evidence of a defendant’s responsibility or guilt (Morse,
2011; Saks, Schweitzer, Aharoni & Kiehl, 2014; Schweitzer
et al., 2011). But it is not entirely clear how members of the
public view these findings. Do they understand the role that
neuroscience information plays in explanations of people’s
beliefs and behaviors?
Previous research suggests that the answer to this ques-
tion is “no”. People are unduly swayed to think favor-
ably of psychology explanations that include references to
neuroscience—even when such neuroscience information
is logically irrelevant to the explanations (Weisberg, Keil,
Goodstein, Rawson & Gray, 2008). In this study, subjects
read descriptions of psychological phenomena. Each phe-
nomenon was followed by one of four types of explanation,
constructed by crossing explanation quality (good or bad)
with neuroscience information (present or absent). Cru-
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cially, the neuroscience information was irrelevant to the
logic of the explanations and even made the good explana-
tions worse, according to the ratings of experts.
When the explanations contained neuroscience informa-
tion, ratings were significantly higher than when they did
not. This was especially true for the bad explanations (per-
haps because people have trouble detecting circularity in
arguments, see Rips, 2002). That is, non-experts judged
that psychological phenomena are explained better using
the language of neuroscience, although this language should
make no difference, assuming that an explanation’s quality
is drawn primarily from the strength of its logic. One re-
cent study (Scurich & Shniderman, 2014) also found that
subjects give higher ratings to studies that included neuro-
science information, but only when the conclusions of these
studies confirmed their prior beliefs. However, the absence
of a no-neuroscience control condition in this study makes
it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the general effect
of neuroscience information.
Three other studies did include the appropriate controls,
and both confirmed Weisberg et al.’s (2008) findings. One
used the same stimuli in an exact replication (Fernandez-
Duque, Evans, Christian & Hodges, 2015). The other
two used different sets of stimuli in a conceptual replica-
tion (Rhodes, Rodriguez & Shah, 2014; Rhodes & Shah,
2015), in which subjects read a mock news article describ-
ing psychological research; the article either did or did not
contain irrelevant neuroscience information. Neuroscience
information thus exerts a seductive allure effect, whereby
people without advanced training believe that references to
brain processes improve the quality of a psychological ex-
planation, even when these references are logically irrele-
vant. This effect could be thought of as part of a family of
429
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heuristics that people use for judging the quality of explana-
tions, which includes teleological information (Lombrozo
& Carey, 2006) and an intuitive sense of satisfaction (Trout,
2002).
One study claimed that neuroscience images are respon-
sible for the effect (McCabe & Castel, 2008), suggesting
that people are seduced by the visual appeal of images gen-
erated by fMRI scans and other neuroscientific techniques.
However, many later studies have failed to replicate this
finding (Gruber & Dickerson, 2012; Hook & Farah, 2013;
Keehner, Mayberry & Fischer, 2011; Michael, Newman,
Vuorre, Cumming & Garry, 2013; see Farah & Hook, 2013,
for review). To test directly whether brain images add value
to explanations that already contained neuroscience text,
Fernandez-Duque et al. (2015) presented subjects with ex-
planations that either contained no neuroscience informa-
tion, contained irrelevant neuroscience information, or con-
tained irrelevant neuroscience information and were accom-
panied by a neuroscience image. These researchers found
that people rated explanations with neuroscience informa-
tion as better than explanations without this information,
as noted above, but images did not have any additional ef-
fect. Further, Weisberg et al. (2008), Fernandez-Duque et al.
(2015), Rhodes et al. (2014), and Rhodes and Shah (2015)
obtained the seductive allure effect without the use of any
pictures. These studies strongly suggest that neuroscience
imagery is not the source of the effect.
Why, then, does this effect happen? The importance of
answering this question becomes evident when we examine
the many ways in which neuroscience information is used
(and misused) in the public sphere. The proliferation of
headlines proclaiming that some drug or activity “literally
changes your brain” illustrates both how appealing neuro-
science information is to the general public and how poorly
this information is understood. To take a weightier example,
attorneys may appeal to neuroscience-based evidence in or-
der to convince a jury of a legal fact. But because this kind
of information is intuitively compelling even when it is ir-
relevant, such evidence may unduly bias the jury, potentially
threatening the fairness of the judicial system (see Greene &
Cohen, 2004; Morse, 2004). Similarly, in the field of edu-
cation, unsubstantiated claims about how children’s brains
change or fundamental differences between boys’ and girls’
brains can lead to the implementation of educational poli-
cies or practices that seem appealing but may not actually
benefit the students (see Bruer, 1997; Goswami, 2006).
Learning why neuroscience information is alluring can
help us to develop techniques to reverse some of these
trends. The current studies begin to address this issue by
investigating three factors that might contribute to the seduc-
tive allure effect: length (Study 1), explicit appeal of neuro-
science (Study 2), and jargon (Study 3). In terms of length,
the explanations in Weisberg et al. (2008) that contained
irrelevant neuroscientific information were always longer
than the explanations that did not. Subjects may have sim-
ply rated longer explanations as better. Indeed, other work
showed that people prefer longer explanations, even if the
added length did not add to the explanation’s quality (Kikas,
2003). Study 1 thus begins our investigation of this effect by
replicating Weisberg et al. (2008) with the addition of a con-
trol for the length of the explanations.
A second possible explanation for the effect is that neu-
roscience information may appeal due to its authoritative
aesthetic: Explanations containing neuroscience informa-
tion may look as though they have come from a suitably
scientific process, and so may be perceived as trustworthy
and therefore convincing, regardless of their content (see
Sperber, 2010). We address this issue in Study 2 by ask-
ing subjects to directly compare good and bad explanations
when they do and do not contain neuroscience information.
The third possibility that we investigate is that people are
attracted to any kind of scientific-sounding jargon because
they believe that use of these fancy terms signals higher-
quality science. Indeed, math-based jargon has precisely
this effect (Eriksson, 2012). We address this issue in Study
3 by comparing subjects’ ratings of explanations that use
simple references to brain processes with their ratings of ex-
planations that use more technical terms.
2 Study 1
Study 1 was designed to determine whether the seductive al-
lure effect results from subjects’ responses to neuroscience
information itself or from the tendency for explanations con-
taining neuroscience information to be longer than explana-
tions without this information. Previous work suggests that
length does not account for the effect: Fernandez-Duque et
al. (2015) found that explanations with added neuroscience
information were rated more highly than unembellished ex-
planations, but explanations with added social psychology
information were not. In addition, Rhodes et al. (2014)
found that stimuli with neuroscience information were rated
more highly than length-matched stimuli without neuro-
science information. These results suggest that the seductive
allure effect cannot be accounted for solely by the explana-
tions’ length.
Study 1 continued this investigation of the role of length
and addressed a potential issue with the method used in
previous studies. Both Fernandez-Duque et al. (2015)
and Rhodes et al. (2014) controlled for length by mak-
ing the without-neuroscience explanations longer, so as to
match the length of the with-neuroscience stimuli. But
this additional information may have affected how subjects
rated the without-neuroscience explanations. For example,
Fernandez-Duque et al. (2015) compared explanations with
superfluous information from social science or hard sciences
to those with superfluous neuroscience information. How-
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ever, this information from other fields may have seemed
less relevant to the explanations than the neuroscience in-
formation, potentially lowering subjects’ ratings. Thus this
design does not separate the effect of length from the ef-
fect of different types of added information. The current
study made the with-neuroscience explanations shorter so
as to match the length of the without-neuroscience stimuli.
This more fully un-confounds the variables of length and
neuroscience information.
Study 1 thus provides a more complete investigation of
the potential effect of length on the seductive allure effect,
which will allow us to determine how neuroscience informa-
tion affects people’s judgments. If the seductive allure effect
is only due to a general tendency to judge longer explana-
tions as better, then it should disappear when the explana-
tions that do and do not contain neuroscience are matched
for length. But if something about neuroscience informa-
tion leads to more positive judgments of explanations, then
the effect of neuroscience should remain regardless of the
length of the explanation.
2.1 Method
Subjects. We recruited subjects from two populations:
undergraduate students from the psychology subject pool at
the University of Pennsylvania and workers on Mechanical
Turk. Because previous work on this topic has primarily
used undergraduates as subjects, we added the MTurk work-
ers in order to assess the generality of the effect in a more
representative population. This study included 204 under-
graduates (143 women, 61 men; mean age = 19.8 years,
range = 18–50) and 177 MTurk workers (85 women, 92
men; mean age = 37.5 years, range = 19–70). Undergradu-
ates received course credit for participating in the study, and
MTurk workers received 20 cents.
Design. Subjects were divided into 4 conditions accord-
ing to a 2 (Neuroscience: with, without) x 2 (Length: long,
short) design. These were both between-subjects variables,
so an individual subject saw explanations that either all in-
cluded or all did not include neuroscience information, and
their explanations would all come from the same length cat-
egory. There were 43 MTurk workers and 44 undergrad-
uates in With Neuroscience-Long, 40 MTurk workers and
65 undergraduates in With Neuroscience-Short, 49 MTurk
workers and 50 undergraduates in Without Neuroscience-
Long, and 45 MTurk workers and 45 undergraduates in
Without Neuroscience-Short. Quality was a within-subjects
variable; for each trial, the survey software randomly de-
termined whether to show the good or bad version of the
explanation.1
1Due to the randomization, there were 47 subjects who saw either good
explanations on every trial or bad explanations on every trial. The inclusion
of these subjects did not affect any analyses, so they were left in the sample.
Materials. We selected four of the 18 items presented to
subjects in Weisberg et al. (2008) and Fernandez-Duque et
al. (2015) (babies’ abilities to do simple arithmetic, atten-
tional blink, gender differences in spatial reasoning, and dif-
ferences between seeing and imagining objects; see supple-
mental materials for full stimulus items). These were items
for which subjects in a pilot sample consistently judged
the bad version of the without-neuroscience explanation as
worse than the good version of that explanation. Each of
the four items consisted of a description of a psycholog-
ical phenomenon and eight different explanations for that
phenomenon. The good explanations are the ones that the
researchers themselves provided for the phenomena or that
were provided in psychology textbooks. The bad explana-
tions were circular restatements of the phenomena with no
mechanistic information that could give a reason for the phe-
nomenon. Items in all studies are in the supplement.
The explanations used in the Without Neuroscience-
Short and the With Neuroscience-Long conditions exactly
matched those used in Weisberg et al. (2008). To construct
the Without Neuroscience-Long explanations, we added su-
perfluous wording to the existing Without Neuroscience-
Short explanations to make them the same length as the cor-
responding With Neuroscience-Long explanations. Impor-
tantly, this additional wording referred only to psychological
constructs and never to other sciences, mathematics, or neu-
roscience, and this information did not add any value to the
explanation. To construct the With Neuroscience-Short ex-
planations, we edited the existing With Neuroscience-Long
explanations to make them the same length as the corre-
sponding Without Neuroscience-Short explanations. Re-
gardless of length, the irrelevant neuroscience information
was identical across the good and bad versions of the expla-
nations for each phenomenon.
Procedure. All subjects completed an online survey dis-
tributed on Qualtrics. In each trial, subjects read a descrip-
tion of a psychological phenomenon, which appeared in iso-
lation on the screen for 10 seconds before they were allowed
to advance to the next screen. On the second screen of each
trial, the phenomenon appeared again at the top, followed by
one of the eight possible explanations for that phenomenon.
Subjects were asked to judge how satisfying they found this
explanation on a seven-point scale, from –3 (very unsatisfy-
ing) to +3 (very satisfying), with 0 as the neutral midpoint.
Each subject saw all four stimulus items, one per trial, in
a randomized order. On each trial, the phenomenon was pre-
sented along with one version of the explanation. Subjects’
condition determined whether they saw a long or short ver-
sion and a with- or without-neuroscience version. Whether
they saw a good or bad version of the explanation was ran-
domly determined on each trial (as described above in the
Design section). At the end of the survey, subjects provided
basic demographic information: age in years, gender, and
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Table 1: Study 1 mixed-effects linear regression model (∗
p < .05).
Predictor Estimate [95% CI] t
Intercept 0.24 [ 0.14, 0.34] 5.00∗
Item 2 0.24 [ 0.10, 0.38] 3.21∗
Item 3 –0.61 [–0.74, –0.47] –8.82∗
Item 4 0.65 [ 0.21, 0.79] 9.41∗
Length 0.12 [ 0.02, 0.21] 2.55∗
Neuroscience 0.13 [ 0.03, 0.22] 2.70∗
Group 0.15 [ 0.06, 0.25] 3.18∗
Quality 0.36 [ 0.28, 0.44] 8.47∗
Neuroscience x Item 2 –0.05 [–0.19, 0.10] –0.72
Neuroscience x Item 3 0.20 [ 0.06, 0.34] 2.93∗
Neuroscience x Item 4 –0.24 [–0.37, –0.10] –3.45∗
Group x Item 2 0.03 [–0.11, 0.17] 0.50
Group x Item 3 0.16 [ 0.01, 0.30] 2.34∗
Group x Item 4 –0.19 [–0.34, –0.05] –2.71∗
Quality x Item 2 0.08 [–0.08, 0.20] 1.06
Quality x Item 3 –0.14 [–0.28, –0.02] –1.94∗
Quality x Item 4 –0.25 [–0.38, –0.12] –3.57∗
Note: This regression predicted subjects’ ratings of the qual-
ity of the explanations. The intercept represents the Without
Neuroscience condition, short explanations, undergraduate
subjects, and bad explanations. Item is deviation coded,
such that the coefficient for each level represents deviation
from the grand mean; Item 1 is the reference level.
level of education (for the MTurk subjects) or class year and
major (for the undergraduates).
2.2 Results
Unlike in Weisberg et al. (2008), some subjects in the cur-
rent study received unequal numbers of good and bad expla-
nations. In order to deal with this, we conducted a mixed-
effects linear regression. The model included random in-
tercepts by subject as well as random slopes by subject for
the effect of Quality (the only within-subjects variable). We
tested effects of Item, Group (MTurk or undergraduates),
Length (long or short), Neuroscience (present or absent),
and Quality (good or bad) and their interactions2; the model
that best fit the data is shown in Table 1.
2Preliminary analyses revealed one effect of gender: an interaction be-
tween gender and explanation length. Men’s ratings did not differ for long
explanations (M = 0.27, SD = 1.75) and short explanations (M = 0.33, SD
= 1.74). However, women rated long explanations (M = 0.38, SD = 1.76)
more highly than short explanations (M = –0.03, SD = 1.81). We have no
explanation for this unexpected gender difference, and because gender did
not affect the other variables, we did not consider gender for the remainder
Figure 1: Average ratings of explanation quality in Study
1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the
means.
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This test revealed a main effect of Quality (Figure 1),
where good explanations (M = 0.58, SD = 1.68) were rated
more highly than bad explanations (M = –0.13, SD = 1.80).
There was also a main effect of Neuroscience: Explanations
that contained neuroscience (M = 0.34, SD = 1.75) were
rated more highly than explanations that did not (M = 0.11,
SD = 1.80). We also found a main effect of Length: Long
explanations (M = 0.34, SD = 1.76) were rated more highly
than short explanations (M = 0.12, SD = 1.79). Finally, there
was a main effect of Group: MTurk workers (M = 0.37, SD
= 1.73) gave overall higher ratings than undergraduates (M
= 0.10, SD = 1.80).
The effects of Group, Neuroscience, and Quality also var-
ied by item, as indicated by the significant interactions. To
examine these interactions, we conducted separate linear re-
gressions for each item examining main effects of Group,
Neuroscience, Length, and Quality. The results are summa-
rized in Table 2. Although the magnitudes (and therefore
significance levels) of the effects varied by item, only two
effects were not in the predicted directions; for Item 4, there
were non-significant negative effects of Group and Neuro-
science. The effects of neuroscience for Item 2 and quality
for Item 4 were small and non-significant, but in the pre-
dicted directions.
of our analyses.
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Table 2: Regression coefficients for individual item analysis
in Study 1 (∗ p < .05, + p < .10).
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4
Length 0.04 0.05 0.17+ 0.19∗
Neuroscience 0.22∗ 0.08 0.34∗ –0.10
Group 0.14 0.18∗ 0.30∗ –0.06
Quality 0.69∗ 0.44∗ 0.23∗ 0.08
2.3 Discussion
Study 1 was designed to replicate the seductive allure effect
and test for the contribution of explanation length. Subjects
did indeed judge longer explanations as better than shorter
ones overall, demonstrating a general bias towards longer
explanations. However, this length preference does not fully
explain the seductive allure of neuroscience. Making expla-
nations longer does make them seem better, but adding neu-
roscience information does as well, and these two modifica-
tions had independent effects. This result confirms other re-
cent studies that show that the seductive allure effect obtains
when explanation length is controlled (Fernandez-Duque et
al., 2015; Rhodes et al., 2014).
There was also a strong effect of explanation quality:
Good explanations were judged as better than bad expla-
nations overall. This result demonstrates that people are not
generally confused about what makes certain explanations
better than others and are able to distinguish between good
and bad explanations. However, as noted above, the addition
of neuroscience information interferes with this ability.
Finally, we found that undergraduates gave overall lower
ratings than MTurk workers. This is likely not due to the un-
dergraduates having a higher level of education, since 99%
of the MTurk workers reported having at least some college
education, and 50% reported earning an advanced degree.
Instead, the experience of participating in research as part
of a class, or of currently being a member of an educational
community, may serve to increase overall skepticism. Re-
gardless, both populations showed the same general pattern
of responses to the explanations (i.e., there were no signifi-
cant interactions with subject group).
These main effects appeared in nearly the same way for
all four items; however, there were some differences in how
subjects responded to the four phenomena. Notably, the
phenomenon describing the differences between seeing and
imagining objects (Item 4) did not show an effect of Quality
or Neuroscience. This item was rated higher overall than the
others (as indicated by the significant main effect for Item 4
in the regression), and there was little difference in ratings
between the different versions of the explanation. In addi-
tion, the phenomenon describing attentional blink (Item 2)
did not show as strong of an effect of Neuroscience. This
may be due to the fact that the neuroscience information in
the explanations of this phenomenon is entirely contained in
the first sentence, separate from the explanatory (or circu-
lar) information in the second sentence. This structure may
have made it easier for subjects to see that the neuroscience
information was not relevant to the explanation’s quality.
Overall, Study 1 demonstrates that the seductive allure ef-
fect replicates and is not solely due to length. Study 2 begins
to more directly address why the effect happens. To do so,
rather than asking subjects to rate single explanations for a
phenomenon, we ask them to choose which of two explana-
tions they find most satisfying. Each pair contained a good
explanation and a bad explanation, but either both contained
neuroscience, neither contained neuroscience, or only the
bad explanation contained neuroscience. This is a some-
what less ecologically valid design, since it is rare that peo-
ple would need to evaluate multiple explanations for a single
phenomenon. However, this design allows us to test directly
how neuroscience information may interfere with people’s
ability to distinguish good from bad explanations. Given
previous results, we expected that subjects would generally
be able to distinguish good from bad explanations if both or
neither contained neuroscience. If, however, neuroscience
information has the effect of masking the poor quality of the
bad explanations, people should be less likely to distinguish
good from bad explanations when only the bad one contains
neuroscience.
3 Study 2
3.1 Method
Subjects. This study included 130 undergraduates (86 fe-
male, 44 male; mean age = 19.5 years, range = 18–27) and
130 MTurk workers (90 female, 37 male, three unreported;
mean age = 40.6 years, range = 19–71). The undergradu-
ates were recruited from the psychology subject pool at the
University of Pennsylvania and received course credit for
their participation. The MTurk workers were recruited from
Amazon’s system and were paid 20 cents for their partici-
pation. An additional seven subjects (three MTurk workers
and four undergraduates) were recruited but excluded from
the final analyses for failing an attention check (described
below).
Design. There were three between-subjects conditions in
this study. As in Study 1, there were four trials per subject,
each of which used a different phenomenon (order random-
ized). Each phenomenon was accompanied by both a good
and a bad explanation. In the Without Neuroscience con-
dition (41 MTurk workers and 43 undergraduates), neither
explanation contained any neuroscience information, and in
the With Neuroscience condition (42 MTurk workers and 45
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undergraduates), both explanations contained neuroscience
information. The crucial condition was the Mixed condition
(47 MTurk workers and 42 undergraduates), in which the
good explanation did not contain neuroscience information
and the bad one did, pitting quality and neuroscience against
each other.
Materials. We used the same four phenomena as in Study
1, accompanied by the short versions of the four possible
explanations for each phenomenon: good and bad explana-
tions both with and without irrelevant neuroscience infor-
mation (see supplemental materials).
Procedure. Subjects completed an online survey dis-
tributed on Qualtrics. For each trial, they first read a descrip-
tion of a psychological phenomenon, which appeared in iso-
lation on the screen for 10 seconds before they were allowed
to advance to the next screen. On the second screen of each
trial, the phenomenon appeared again at the top, followed
by the prompt, “Please choose which explanation you find
more satisfying.” Subjects always saw one good explana-
tion and one bad explanation as well as the choice “both are
equal.” The “equal” option always appeared in the center,
with the left/right position of the good and bad explanations
randomized across trials. After making their choice, sub-
jects were asked to explain why they had made that choice
in one or two sentences. There were four such trials in the
experiment, each involving a different phenomenon and its
accompanying explanations.
After the second of the four trials, subjects engaged in an
attention check. Following methods recommended in Op-
penheimer, Meyvis & Davidenko (2009), this checking trial
presented another phenomenon and two explanations so that
it looked superficially like the other four trials. For this trial,
we included instructions at the end of the phenomenon de-
scription telling subjects to choose the “equal” option and to
write that they had done so as their justification. As noted
above, we excluded seven subjects who failed this check
by selecting a different option. At the end of the survey,
subjects provided the same demographic information as in
Study 1: age, gender, and education level.
3.2 Results
To analyze the data, we conducted a mixed-effects logistic
regression predicting whether subjects selected the good ex-
planation on each trial, considering this response as correct
and the other two responses (selecting the bad explanation
or the “both are equal” option) as incorrect. The model in-
cluded random intercepts by subject. We tested effects of
Item, Group (MTurk workers or undergraduates), Condition
(With Neuroscience, Without Neuroscience or Mixed), and
possible interactions. Preliminary analyses found no effect
Table 3: Study 2 mixed-effects logistic regression model (∗
p < .05).
Predictor Estimate SE z
Intercept 0.05 0.14 0.33
Item 2 0.67 0.13 5.05∗
Item 3 –0.25 0.12 –2.08∗
Item 4 –0.94 0.13 –7.44∗
Group 0.25 0.14 1.75
Without Neuroscience condition 0.63 0.21 3.08∗
With Neuroscience condition 1.12 0.22 5.18∗
Group x Item 2 –0.20 0.13 –1.52
Group x Item 3 0.19 0.12 1.53
Group x Item 4 0.37 0.12 3.05∗
Without Neuroscience cond. x Group –0.49 0.21 –2.37∗
With Neuroscience cond. x Group –0.53 0.21 –2.48∗
Note. The intercept represents the Mixed condition and un-
dergraduate subjects. Item is deviation coded, such that the
coefficient for each level represents deviation from the grand
mean; Item 1 is the reference level.
of gender, so this variable is not considered further. The
model that best fit the data is presented in Table 3.
The primary result from these analyses is the significant
main effect of condition: Subjects found it more difficult
to determine which was the good explanation in the Mixed
condition where only the bad explanation contained neu-
roscience (Figure 2). Specifically, subjects were signifi-
cantly more likely to select the good explanation in either
the With Neuroscience (72.0% of trials) or Without Neuro-
science (63.5% of trials) conditions than in the Mixed con-
dition (51.7% of trials).
There was also a significant Group x Condition interac-
tion. Follow-up regressions conducted on each group sep-
arately showed that the MTurk workers were significantly
more likely to select the good explanation in the With Neu-
roscience condition as compared to the Mixed condition (β
= 0.58, p < .05), but there was no significant difference be-
tween the Without Neuroscience and Mixed conditions (β
= 0.15, p = .59). For undergraduate subjects, subjects se-
lected the good option significantly more often in both the
With Neuroscience (β = 1.68, p < .001) and Without Neu-
roscience (β = 1.14, p < .001) conditions than in the Mixed
condition. Thus, although the main effect of condition was
significant in the whole sample, it was driven more by the
undergraduate subjects than by the MTurk workers. Finally,
although there were significant differences between items,
as in Study 1, there was not a significant Item x Condition or
Item x Condition x Group interaction. Therefore, the effect
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Figure 2: Average number of trials on which subjects se-
lected the good explanation in Study 2. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals around the means. The dotted line
represents chance performance since selecting the good ex-
planation was one of three possible responses on each trial.
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of Condition and the Condition x Group interaction were not
significantly different across items.
To gain further insight into subjects’ responses, for the
two conditions that used explanations containing neuro-
science language (With Neuroscience and Mixed), we per-
formed a text search on subjects’ justifications for words re-
lated to neural processes generally (“brain”, “lobe,”, “scan”,
“neur*”) and for the specific neuroscience terms used in the
explanations themselves (“premotor,” “cortex”); 58% of jus-
tifications in these two conditions contained at least one of
these terms. A research assistant, who was blind to condi-
tion, group, and study hypotheses, further coded these justi-
fications for whether subjects referred to the brain as adding
value to an explanation. For example, “this gives a biologi-
cal explanation and uses brain parts to explain”, “brain scans
and timing seem more accurate”, and “it’s more in depth and
seems more factual because it is talking about brain parts
and stuff.” Of justifications that referenced the brain, 84%
did so in this positive way. The remaining justifications sug-
gested a good grasp of the irrelevance of this information,
such as these undergraduates: “I do not want to hear about
what the brain is doing. I am interested in WHY the phe-
nomenon occurs in a more general sense” and “Saying be-
cause of frontal lobe areas is not a sufficient explanation,
but just states where the processing is occurring.” Or, as
one MTurk worker put it, “Talking mumbo jumbo about the
frontal lobes without explaining what is actually happening
is bullshit.”
Each subject was given a score (out of 4) for the number
of positive brain-based justifications they gave. A 2 (Group:
MTurk workers, undergraduates) x 2 (Condition: With Neu-
roscience, Mixed) ANOVA revealed only a significant main
effect of Group, F(1,166) = 7.08, p <.01, η2 = .04: Under-
graduates (M = 0.62, SD = 0.84) were overall more likely
than MTurk workers (M = 0.31, SD = 0.66) to refer to the
brain as adding value to an explanation. There was neither
a significant effect of Condition nor a significant Group x
Condition interaction.
3.3 Discussion
When asked to choose between good and bad explanations
of a psychological phenomenon, subjects selected the good
explanation as being more satisfying on the majority of tri-
als. These results confirm subjects’ ratings from Study 1, in
which subjects tended to rate the good explanations more
positively. Taken together, these results demonstrate that
subjects understand the difference between good and bad
explanations.
The one exception to this conclusion is the Mixed con-
dition, in which the bad explanation contained irrelevant
neuroscience information and the good explanation did not.
Here, subjects were seduced by the presence of neuro-
science information, which made them less likely to pre-
fer the good explanations than in the other conditions. Al-
though the main effect of condition was significant in the
full sample, it was driven primarily by the undergraduates.
Indeed, the undergraduates’ justifications were more likely
to mention neuroscience in a positive light. This suggests
that the presence of neuroscience information played a key
role in convincing these subjects that the bad explanations
were satisfactory. As the justifications quoted above illus-
trate, some undergraduates appeared to rely on the presence
of neuroscience as a heuristic to judge the quality of an ex-
planation.
It is not entirely clear why undergraduates would be more
attracted to explanations containing neuroscience informa-
tion than MTurk workers, although currently learning about
psychological and neuroscientific phenomena might have
swayed the undergraduates to lend more weight to the pres-
ence of neuroscience. One possibility is that, since they cur-
rently are learning about the functions of the brain, reading
about specific phenomena in which the brain appears to play
a causal role leads them to judge explanations with neuro-
science explanations more favorably. In support of this argu-
ment, students who were currently taking a course on neu-
roscience (Weisberg et al., 2008, Study 2) showed a stronger
attraction to explanations containing irrelevant neuroscience
information than students recruited from the introductory
psychology pool (Weisberg et al., 2008, Study 1).
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Finally, subjects’ performance in this study can start to
explain one of the item effects seen in Study 1. Specifi-
cally, in Study 1, the seeing/imagining item (Item 4) was
judged similarly regardless of quality or presence of neu-
roscience. Here in Study 2, about twice as many subjects
chose the “both are equal” option for this item than for the
other three, indicating that they could not see a difference
between the good and bad explanations for this item. The
difference between the two versions was very slight, chang-
ing only “uses the same process” to “results in the same ar-
ray of responses”. In fact, a number of participants explicitly
stated in their justifications that the two explanations seemed
the same (e.g., “Both explanations sound like they are say-
ing the same thing”, “Both explanations are similar and say
the same thing just in a slightly different way.”)
4 Study 3
Having determined that length does not underlie the seduc-
tive allure effect, and that neuroscience information is ef-
fective at disguising bad explanations, Study 3 tested an-
other possible reason that neuroscience explanations are ap-
pealing to subjects, namely that this information tends to in-
clude technical jargon. If subjects are attracted to scientific-
sounding terms, then neuroscience information per se is not
seductive; subjects’ responses can be influenced by the pres-
ence of any jargon. However, technical language and refer-
ences to the brain were confounded in the explanations used
thus far, preventing us from determining whether any refer-
ence to the brain would be sufficient or whether technical
jargon is necessary. Study 3 constructed alternative versions
of these explanations in order to tease out which type of in-
formation is responsible for the seductive allure effect.
This study’s design mirrored that of Study 1, in which
subjects read descriptions of psychological phenomena one
at a time and then rated one explanation of each phe-
nomenon. In Study 3, these explanations came from one of
two sets: Simple Neuroscience, in which the explanations
referred to brain scans and neural processes but in simple
language without reference to specific brain areas, and Neu-
roscience Plus Jargon, in which the explanations included
technical terms to refer to the type of brain scan used and
the individual areas of the brain. In both cases, these stim-
uli were constructed by modifying the Short versions of the
stimuli used in Study 1, and the Short-Without Neuroscience
condition from that study serves as a control condition here.
This set of stimuli allows us to test among three hypothe-
ses. If neuroscience information alone is responsible for
the seductive allure effect, we should expect similar ratings
for the Neuroscience Plus Jargon and the Simple Neuro-
science explanations, both of which should be rated more
highly than the Without Neuroscience explanations. If neu-
roscience information appeals because it contains fancy jar-
gon, then the Neuroscience Plus Jargon explanations should
be rated more highly than the other two, which should not
differ. Finally, there might be an additive effect of jargon
and neuroscience language, in which case the Neuroscience
Plus Jargon explanations would be rated more highly than
the Simple Neuroscience explanations, which would in turn
be rated more highly than the Without Neuroscience expla-
nations.
4.1 Method
Subjects. The final sample for this study included 88 un-
dergraduates (63 female, 25 male; mean age = 19.5 years,
range = 18–22) and 82 MTurk workers (42 female, 38 male,
two unreported; mean age = 35.0 years, range = 19–67). As
in previous studies, the undergraduates were recruited from
the psychology subject pool at the University of Pennsylva-
nia and received course credit for their participation. The
MTurk workers were recruited from Amazon’s system and
were paid 20 cents for their participation. An additional 50
subjects completed the survey but were excluded from the
final analyses for failing an attention check (described be-
low; 22 MTurk workers and 28 undergraduates). Although
more subjects failed the attention check here than in Study
2, the design of this study was different and may have pre-
sented a less engaging task than Study 2, and these numbers
are in line with other studies that included similar attention
checks (see Oppenheimer et al., 2009).
Design. This study used a 2 (Group: MTurk, undergradu-
ate) x 2 (Neuroscience: Simple Neuroscience, Neuroscience
Plus Jargon) x 2 (Quality: good, bad) design. Group and
Neuroscience were between-subjects variables and Quality
was a within-subjects variable.3 Subjects were assigned to
either the Neuroscience Plus Jargon condition (42 MTurk
workers and 44 undergraduates) or the Simple Neuroscience
condition (40 MTurk workers and 44 undergraduates). Data
from the 45 MTurk workers and 45 undergraduates in the
Without Neuroscience-Short condition from Study 1 were
also used here for comparison.
Materials. To construct the stimuli, we used the same four
psychological phenomena as in Studies 1 and 2, and modi-
fied the With Neuroscience-Short explanations to fit the new
conditions (see supplemental materials). Explanations in the
Simple Neuroscience condition removed references to spe-
cific brain-scanning techniques or brain areas and replaced
them with generic terms (“brain scans”, “visual area”). Ex-
planations in the Neuroscience Plus Jargon condition en-
hanced existing references to include as much specific jar-
3As in Study 1, the randomization algorithm led to 11 subjects receiving
either good explanations on every trial or bad explanations on every trial.
The inclusion of these subjects did not affect any analyses, so they were
left in the sample.
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gon as possible (“fMRI scans”, “parietal lobe”). Each ex-
planation had a good and a bad version, and this modified
information was exactly the same in both versions.
Procedure. All subjects filled out an online survey on
Qualtrics. As in Study 1, for each of the four trials, sub-
jects first read a description of one of the four psychological
phenomena, which appeared on the screen for 10 seconds
before they were allowed to advance. On the second screen,
this phenomenon description appeared again, followed by
one of the four possible explanations of the phenomenon,
according to the subject’s assigned condition; whether they
saw the good or bad version of the explanation was ran-
domly determined on each trial (as described above in the
Design section). Subjects were asked to rate how satisfying
they found the explanation on a –3 (very unsatisfying) to +3
(very satisfying) scale. They were then asked to justify their
rating in one or two sentences.
As in Study 2, after the first two trials, we included an
attention check. This attention check presented another de-
scription of a psychological phenomenon and an explana-
tion for it in exactly the same way as the other trials, ex-
cept that the last sentence of the explanation told subjects
to select 3 on the scale. As noted above, 50 subjects failed
this attention check (by failing to select 3 and/or by demon-
strating a lack of attentiveness in their justifications for this
item) and are not included in our analyses. At the end of the
survey, subjects responded to the same basic demographic
questions as in Studies 1 and 2, reporting their age, gender,
and highest level of education.
4.2 Results
In order to have a control condition with which to com-
pare the current subjects’ responses, the analyses for this
study additionally include the responses from the subjects in
the Without Neuroscience-Short condition from Study 1 (45
MTurk workers and 45 undergraduates). Preliminary analy-
ses revealed no effects of gender, so it was not included in
our analyses.
As in Study 1, we conducted a mixed-effects linear re-
gression analysis. The model included random intercepts
by subject as well as random slopes by subject for the
effect of Quality (the only within-subjects variable). We
created two dummy variables to examine the effects of
neuroscience and jargon; the Neuroscience variable coded
whether neuroscience information was present (the Simple
Neuroscience and Neuroscience Plus Jargon conditions) or
absent (the Without Neuroscience condition). Similarly, the
Jargon variable coded whether jargon was present (the Neu-
roscience Plus Jargon condition) or absent (the Simple Neu-
roscience and Without Neuroscience conditions). The re-
gression tested effects of Item, Group (MTurk or undergrad-
uates), Neuroscience (present or absent), Jargon (present or
Table 4: Study 3 mixed-effects linear regression model
(∗ p < .05).
Predictor Estimate [95% CI] t
Intercept 0.02 [–0.19, 0.24] 0.17
Item 2 0.33 [ 0.06, 0.62] 2.19∗
Item 3 –0.91 [–1.24, –0.62] –5.97∗
Item 4 0.98 [ 0.69, 1.25] 6.44∗
Neuroscience 0.27 [ 0.05, 0.51] 2.44∗
Group 0.15 [ 0.05, 0.27] 2.64∗
Quality 0.57 [ 0.35, 0.78] 5.39∗
Neuroscience x Item 2 –0.37 [–0.68, -0.07] –2.42∗
Neuroscience x Item 3 –0.04 [–0.36, 0.27] –0.23
Neuroscience x Item 4 –0.05 [–0.38, 0.28] –0.35
Quality x Item 2 0.12 [–0.18, 0.44] 0.82
Quality x Item 3 –0.39 [–0.67, –0.07] –2.62∗
Quality x Item 4 –0.57 [–0.85, –0.25] –3.83∗
Note: This regression predicted subjects’ ratings of the qual-
ity of the explanations. The intercept represents the explana-
tions that did not contain neuroscience, undergraduate sub-
jects, and bad explanations. Item is deviation coded, such
that the coefficient for each level represents deviation from
the grand mean; Item 1 is the reference level.
absent), and Quality (good or bad) and their interactions; the
model that best fit the data is shown in Table 4.
The analysis revealed significant main effects of Group,
Quality, and Neuroscience (Figure 3). MTurk subjects (M
= 0.33, SD = 1.90) gave higher overall ratings than under-
graduate subjects (M = 0.03, SD = 1.89) , and subjects rated
good explanations (M = 0.52, SD = 1.86) more highly than
bad explanations (M = –0.19, SD = 1.88), replicating the
results of Study 1. The significant main effect of Neuro-
science indicates that explanations were rated more highly
in the two conditions that used neuroscience language (M =
0.29, SD = 1.95) than in the Without Neuroscience condi-
tion (M = –0.03, SD = 1.79). There was no significant effect
of Jargon, meaning that the Neuroscience Plus Jargon con-
dition (M = 0.29, SD = 1.91) was not significantly different
from the other two combined (M = 0.12, SD = 1.89).
As in Study 1, the effects of Neuroscience and Quality
also varied by item, as indicated by significant interactions.
To examine these interactions, we conducted separate linear
regressions for each item examining main effects of Group,
Neuroscience, Length, and Quality. The results are sum-
marized in Table 5. Although the magnitudes (and there-
fore significance levels) of the effects varied by item, only
two effects were not in the predicted directions; consistent
with Study 1, Item 2 had a negative, non-significant effect
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Figure 3: Average ratings of explanation quality in Study 3,
including the Without Neuroscience condition from Study
1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the
means.
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of Neuroscience, and Item 4 had a negative, non-significant
effect of Quality.
To analyze subjects’ justifications, we searched for all ref-
erences to neuroscience, as in Study 2; 24% of all justifica-
tions referenced the brain, and 58% of those did so in a pos-
itive manner. A 2 (Group: MTurk workers, undergraduates)
x 2 (Condition: Simple Neuroscience, Neuroscience Plus
Jargon) ANOVA revealed no significant effects on subjects’
average number of positive brain-based justifications.
However, subjects’ justifications provide further insight
into one of the item effects. Many of the justifications for
the attentional blink item (Item 2), which did not show
a significant neuroscience effect, mentioned that the neu-
roscience information seemed unconnected with the phe-
nomenon: e.g., “The explanation mentions the frontal lobe
areas but does not really say how the areas relate to atten-
tional blink”, and “The explanation does not explain how
frontal areas are related to the temporal relationship between
the two houses.” This item effect was consistent with the
findings from Study 1, and justifications such as this sup-
port our suggestion that putting the information about the
frontal lobe in a separate sentence may have made it easier
for subjects to separate this information from the body of
the explanation, explaining the lesser effect of neuroscience
for this item.
Table 5: Regression coefficients for individual item analysis
in Study 3 (∗ p < .05).
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4
Neuroscience 0.27∗ –0.09 0.24∗ 0.22∗
Quality 0.55∗ 0.69∗ 0.17 –0.01
Group 0.04 0.32∗ 0.18 0.08
4.3 Discussion
Explanations with neuroscience information, whether pre-
sented as simply as possible without jargon or with reference
to specific neural techniques and brain areas, were more sat-
isfying than explanations without neuroscience information.
However, there was no difference between the two neuro-
science conditions. This suggests that any reference to neu-
roscience is sufficient to cause the effect, and that adding
technical jargon does not increase subjects’ ratings.
Additionally, subjects judged good explanations more
highly than bad ones, and undergraduate subjects gave over-
all lower ratings than MTurk workers. These effects repli-
cate the findings of Study 1 and suggest two additional
conclusions. First, people can generally discriminate good
from bad explanations. Second, participating in research as
part of one’s educational experience seems to make subjects
more skeptical overall, but does not eliminate the seductive
allure effect.
These main effects were significant overall, but varied
somewhat by item. As in Study 1, the attentional blink item
(Item 2) did not show an effect of neuroscience information
and the seeing/imagining item (Item 4) did not show an ef-
fect of quality. In the case of the former, as noted above,
the neuroscience information was contained in a separate
sentence rather than being directly linked to the explanatory
information. This may have made it easier for subjects to
realize that this information was irrelevant. In the case of
latter, as in Studies 1 and 2, subjects seemed generally un-
able to tell the difference between the good and bad versions
of this item.
5 General discussion
The seductive allure effect of neuroscience, first observed
by Weisberg et al. (2008), occurs when subjects judge that
explanations for psychological phenomena (especially bad
ones) that contain irrelevant neuroscience information are
better than explanations that do not. The current studies pro-
vide new insight into why this effect happens.
First, although the original stimuli used to demon-
strate this effect confounded neuroscience information
with length, our Study 1 and independent replications by
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Fernandez-Duque et al. (2015) and Rhodes et al. (2014;
2015) using different methods show that length does not ac-
count for the effect. Subjects do judge longer explanations
as significantly better, but they also judge explanations with
neuroscience information as significantly better when length
has been controlled for. Something about neuroscience in-
formation itself, then, is responsible for the effect.
Study 2 showed that, although subjects generally chose
correctly when explicitly comparing good and bad expla-
nations, subjects were still seduced into choosing the bad
explanation when it contained neuroscience information but
the good explanation did not. Surprisingly, undergraduates’
justifications indicate that they explicitly used the presence
of neuroscience as a marker of a good explanation. These
results thus provide an especially direct demonstration of
the power of neuroscience information for this population.
These results also suggest that education in the field of psy-
chology, at least at the introductory level, might aggravate
the effect. Further, results from Study 3 suggest that it is not
simply fancy terms or scientific jargon that seduces subjects.
Rather, any reference to the brain was sufficient to make an
explanation seem more satisfying than a logically parallel
explanation without any such references.
Having eliminated these potential explanations for the se-
ductive allure effect, we are left with the general questions
of why this effect happens and of whether it is unique to psy-
chology. One possibility is that people are generally skep-
tical about psychology (Ferguson, 2015; Keil, Lockhart &
Schlegel, 2010; Lilienfeld, 2012), believing that its inves-
tigative methods do not justify it as a “real science”. An
extreme version of this skepticism would endorse explana-
tions that eliminate psychological terms altogether and uti-
lize only neuroscience vocabulary. According to this theory,
explanations that reference “harder” sciences may be seen as
generally better across disciplines, but will have a more pro-
nounced effect in psychology because of a general bias to-
wards making psychological explanations sound “more sci-
entific”. Indeed, this may have been the strategy adopted
by the undergraduates in Study 2, who explicitly reported
liking explanations more when they contained brain-based
language.
A second possibility is that people are intuitively dualist.
Even though people may explicitly assert that the brain is
involved in cognitive tasks, rejecting a strict Cartesian sub-
stance dualism, they may nevertheless fail to acknowledge
the causal role of the brain in all aspects of our mental and
emotional lives (Bloom, 2004, 2006). For example, in a re-
cent study, subjects were told about a hypothetical machine
that could perfectly duplicate people or animals, down to
the very last cell (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2015). Subjects
typically said that physical traits, such as scars or illnesses,
would be preserved in the copy, but they were less likely to
say the same for mental traits, such as emotions or memo-
ries. Results like this suggest that people believe that some-
thing over and above the physical brain is at least partly
responsible for thoughts and feelings. They may thus be
attracted to neuroscience information because they find it
surprising and compelling when neural activity is shown to
underlie mental activity. On this view, the seductive allure
effect may be unique to psychology, since issues of dualism
do not generally arise in other sciences.
A third possibility is that people may see explanations
that contain neuroscience as providing additional causal in-
formation. Previous work has shown that people are sen-
sitive to descriptions of causes. For example, subjects are
less likely to ignore base rates when provided with informa-
tion that causally links the base rates to the target outcome
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). People are also particularly
biased towards teleological information, which provides ev-
idence of an ultimate cause for an event (Kelemen, 1999;
Lombrozo & Carey, 2006; Lombrozo, Kelemen & Zaitchik,
2007). Differential responses to our four stimulus items also
suggest that stronger effects obtain when the neuroscience
information is described as causally related to the explana-
tion (e.g., “the parietal lobe governed the babies’ expecta-
tions . . . ”). If brain processes are seen as providing an un-
derlying cause for the psychological phenomena in question,
then their appeal may be due to this general bias. Unlike the
previous two possibilities, if this explanation for the effect
is correct, then the effect should appear across a range of
sciences.
Finally, it possible that neuroscience seduces because of a
general preference for reductive explanations (Craver, 2007;
Garfinkel, 1981; Trout, 2007). These explanations recruit
the vocabularies and methods of scientific disciplines that
are considered more fundamental (Oppenheim & Putnam,
1958). This is not in itself an error; explanations with a
reductionist form are often of high quality. But the expla-
nations in this case have this form without any accompany-
ing content, since the reductionist (neuroscience) informa-
tion did not provide any additional explanatory power.
If reductionism is indeed the key to explaining the seduc-
tive allure effect, then neuroscience information produces
the effect because people see psychology as dependent upon
neuroscience to verify its claims. If this is the case, then this
effect should not be unique to psychological phenomena, but
rather should appear across a variety of sciences. For ex-
ample, an explanation of a biological phenomenon might be
seen as more satisfying when it includes references to chem-
ical processes, even if the chemical information is irrelevant.
An ongoing study is investigating this hypothesis, drawing
phenomena and explanations from across the social and nat-
ural sciences to test whether the seductive allure effect may
appear in different disciplines. Results from this study can
cast additional light on why the effect happens.
Insights from experts can also help with this effort: Neu-
roscience experts in Weisberg et al. (2008) were not seduced
by information that came from their own domain of exper-
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tise (see also Eriksson, 2012), suggesting that increased ed-
ucation can be an effective antidote. If experts are immune
to some aspects of the seductive allure effect, their responses
can provide insight into how to prevent it.
Regardless of whether the seductive allure effect is spe-
cific to psychology or also appears in other fields, it has im-
portant implications for how scientific information is com-
municated to the public (Weisberg, 2008). Since some in-
dividuals may use the presence of neuroscience information
as a marker of a good explanation, like the undergraduates
who participated in Study 2, it is imperative to find ways
to increase general awareness of the proper role for neuro-
science information in explanations of psychological phe-
nomena. The present studies suggest that this effect is robust
against changes to an explanation’s length and to the terms
in which the neuroscience information is described, imply-
ing that preventing the seductive allure effect from happen-
ing may be difficult. Future studies should continue to in-
vestigate why neuroscience information is so alluring, and
to what types of subjects, in order to combat the superflu-
ous appeals to neuroscience that are currently popular—and
convincing—in public debates.
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